Religiosity and Economic Policies in Transition Countries by Popova, Olga
www.ssoar.info
Religiosity and Economic Policies in Transition
Countries
Popova, Olga
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Popova, O. (2015). Religiosity and Economic Policies in Transition Countries. (IOS Policy Issues, 7). Regensburg:
Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (IOS). https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-63314-8
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Basic Digital Peer Publishing-Lizenz
zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den DiPP-Lizenzen
finden Sie hier:
http://www.dipp.nrw.de/lizenzen/dppl/service/dppl/
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a Basic Digital Peer
Publishing Licence. For more Information see:
http://www.dipp.nrw.de/lizenzen/dppl/service/dppl/
  
 
Policy Issues 
No. 7 May 2015 
Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung 
Landshuter Straße 4, D-93047 Regensburg 
Telefon: ++49 (09 41) 943 54-10 
E-Mail: info@ios-regensburg.de 
Internet: www.ios-regensburg.de 
 
 
Policy Issues No. 7 (April 2015) | 1 
Religiosity and Economic Policies in Transition Countries 
Olga Popova 
For decades traditional religions in the countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe were 
suppressed by the communist regime. After the fall of the Soviet Union most of these economies experienced the 
revival of religiosity. This report documents differences in religiosity trends between country groups in transition 
economies and underscores implications of religiosity revival for economic policies.  
 
 
The revival of religiosity 
In countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe (CEE), hereinafter transition 
countries, the communist regime suppressed traditional 
religions for many years.1 After the fall of the Soviet 
Union, an increasing interest in religion became notice-
able in most of these countries.  
Several surveys of individuals, including the World Val-
ues Survey (WVS), document the revival of religiosity in 
transition economies. In the WVS individual anonymous 
interviews are conducted with people from more than 
50 countries in the world during the period 1981–2014. 
Individuals are asked about their attitudes, values, and 
activities, e.g., about their civic participation, institutional 
and interpersonal trust, life satisfaction, religiosity, atti-
tudes toward minorities, gender equality, income redis-
tribution, among other questions. Also, socioeconomic 
characteristics of respondents are recorded, including 
age, gender, employment status, etc.  
Data from WVS (2009) show that more than 70 per-
cent of respondents in most transition countries con-
sider themselves as being religious and state the im-
portance of God in their life. 
Historically, European countries, including transition 
economies, had a high number of adherents of tradi-
tional religions. In Figure 1, religious participation rates 
 
 
defined as the percentage of population belonging to 
traditional religious denominations, including Buddhism, 
Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and others, are presented 
for the FSU, CEE, and Western European (WE) coun-
tries in 1900, 1970, 2000, 2005, and 2025 (forecast). 
This evidence is based on censuses, expert opinions, 
and church statistics from the World Christian Database 
(WCD). 
 
Figure 1: Religious participation rates in Europe 
 
Source: The World Christian Database; author’s calculations. 
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As seen from Figure 1, in 1900 all European countries 
had religious participation rates close to 100%. With the 
establishment of the communist ideology, especially in 
the FSU countries, participation rates declined steadily. 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to a gradual 
increase in religious participation in the FSU and CEE 
countries. Forecasts suggest that by 2025 religious 
participation rates in the FSU and CEE will remain simi-
larly high. 
Figure 1 reveals a gradual decline in religious participa-
tion in Western Europe. This decline is consistent with a 
so-called secularization theory, which suggests that 
economic development and progress lead to a de-
crease in religious activities and beliefs and to a shrink-
ing role of religiosity in the public sphere (see Need and 
Evans 2001, among others).  
Table 1: Adherents of different religions in transition 
countries (the share of population) 
Denomination 1900 1970 2005 
 Former Soviet Union 
Christians 0.484 0.270 0.418 
Muslims 0.500 0.266 0.396 
Other religions 0.016 0.005 0.003 
Atheists and the non-religious 0.001 0.456 0.181 
 Central and Eastern Europe 
Christians 0.809 0.618 0.664 
Muslims 0.169 0.162 0.209 
Other religions 0.016 0.002 0.002 
Atheists and the non-religious 0.004 0.218 0.126 
Source: The World Christian Database, author’s calculations. 
 
Traditionally popular religions in transition countries are 
Christianity and Islam. Table 1 shows the share of 
population belonging to different religious denomina-
tions in the FSU and CEE countries. It is noticeable that 
religiosity trends in these groups of countries differ. 
Historically, the adherents of Christianity have a greater 
share of population in CEE countries than in the FSU. 
During the communist regime the share of religious popu-
lation decreased in this region. After 1970, the shares of 
different religions become relatively stable in CEE.  
In the FSU the situation differs. In 1900 the population 
was divided equally between Christians and Muslims. 
The territories of present Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova, Russian Federation, and Ukraine were pre-
dominantly populated by Christians, while in those of 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turk-
menistan, and Uzbekistan lived the adherents of Islam. 
Although major religions remain the same in these 
countries, by 1970 atheists and the non-religious 
reached almost half of the population in the FSU. Today 
the share of people belonging to religious denomina-
tions in the FSU countries is rising again.  
It is also noticeable that the number of adherents of 
different religions in both CEE and the FSU is still below 
the historical level of 1900, while the number of atheists 
and the non-religious remains high. This suggests that 
the secularization theory may also be applicable to both 
CEE and the FSU countries, since both country groups 
developed economically over recent decades. 
 
Religiosity and economic development 
A helpful tool to analyze how religiosity is affected by 
economic development is the global cultural map con-
structed by Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 2010). In Fig-
ures 2 and 3 this map is presented for 1999–2004 and 
for 2010–2014, respectively, while in Figure 4, a change 
over 1999–2014 is depicted. The periods 1999–2004 
and 2010–2014 correspond to data collection periods of 
WVS (2005) and WVS (2015), respectively. The maps 
are based on the statistical analysis of various individ-
ual values that are explained below. Each country is 
placed in the map according to a specific relationship 
between religious and economic values. Then countries 
are grouped into clusters according cultural proximity. 
The maps have two dimensions, namely, traditional/ 
secular-rational values (a vertical axis) and the sur-
vival/self-expression values (a horizontal axis).  
Figure 2: The cultural map of the world, 1999–2004 
 
Source: Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p.63), WVS (2005).  
 
In the first dimension (traditional/secular-rational val-
ues) traditional values emphasize a high role of reli-
gion, the importance of family, deference to authority, 
and high levels of national pride, while secular-rational 
values indicate lower importance of religion stated by 
individuals. In general, this dimension represents the 
importance of traditional and religious values in a so-
ciety. 
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In the second dimension (the survival/self-expression 
values) survival values include economic and physical 
security, while self-expression values underscore the 
importance of quality of life, equality, diversity, and par-
ticipation in economic and political life. As Inglehart and 
Welzel (2005, 2010) argue, this dimension characterizes 
the transition from industrial to post-industrial economy. 
As can be seen from Figure 2, in 1999–2004 ex-
communist countries fell into the top-left quadrant of the 
map. This means that even though individuals in most of 
the FSU countries declare high religious participation, 
they still have more secular and survival values. This is 
also true for the CEE countries, although individuals in 
some CEE countries are more likely to declare self-
expression values than individuals from the FSU. These 
differences between individuals from the FSU and CEE 
countries are relatively stable over time, since a similar 
pattern is also observed in 2010–2014 (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3: The cultural map of the world, 2010–2014 
 
Source: Institute for Future Studies (http://www.iffs.se/en/world-values-
survey), WVS (2015). 
 
In Figure 4, the change of the cultural map over time is 
presented. Colored clusters in Figure 4 are the same as 
in Figure 2, while arrows show the direction of change 
in the position of these clusters between 1999–2004 
(Figure 2) and 2010–2014 (Figure 3). 
According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005) and consis-
tently with the secularization theory, with economic 
development, the countries tend to move from the 
bottom-left corner of the map to the top-right corner. It 
means that as a country develops economically, tradi-
tional religious beliefs as well as survival values are 
replaced by secular and self-expression values. Re-
search findings document this trend for most devel-
oped countries. The upward trend for the developed 
countries is also seen in Figure 4. 
To what extent can the secularization theory be applied 
to transition countries? Need and Evans (2001) provide 
some support to this theory for selected post-communist 
countries, including Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, 
Ukraine, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 
and Slovakia, but warn that trends in religious participa-
tion and economic development in these countries 
should be analyzed taking into account specific institu-
tional conditions in a particular country. 
 
Figure 4: The cultural map’s change from 1999 to 2014 
 
Source: constructed by the author based on Figures 2 and 3.  
 
Interestingly enough, over time, values in CEE and the 
FSU countries change differently (see Figures 3 and 4). In 
the period 2010–2014, as compared to 1999–2004, in 
most CEE countries, individuals tend to have slightly 
more secular and self-expression values. This is in accor-
dance with the secularization theory. In contrast, individu-
als in the FSU countries tend to have more traditional and 
self-expression values. These differences in values can 
be explained by uneven economic development of CEE 
and the FSU. While the economic development of CEE 
catches up to Western European countries, the FSU 
countries still have more uncertainty and undergo a num-
ber of economic reforms. This creates differences in re-
ligiosity trends between CEE and the FSU. 
 
Religiosity and public policies 
Most religions call upon their adherents to follow specific 
moral norms. This is reflected in individual behavior and 
attitudes. For instance, religious people are likely to avoid 
unhealthy behavior, including drugs, tobacco, and alcohol 
consumption, and have varying attitudes toward justice 
and ethics. This implies that a range of public policies 
from welfare redistribution, family, health, and education 
policies to the future of biotechnologies may be affected 
by the revival of religiosity in transition countries. 
As an example of such influence, one may consider a 
compulsory religious component within a state-provided 
education in some post-communist countries. For in-
stance, in 2012 Russian authorities introduced a com-
pulsory course for elementary school education entitled 
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“Principles of religious cultures and secular ethics”. In 
this course pupils and their parents have to choose one 
of six suggested modules, including “Principles of Or-
thodoxy”, “Principles of Islam”, “Principles of Judaism”, 
“Principles of Buddhism”, “Principles of global religious 
cultures”, and “Principles of secular ethics”. Currently, 
this course is introduced to several grades of the ele-
mentary school education in Russia, but the extension 
of this course to all school grades is being considered. 
The statistics provided by the Russian Ministry of Educa-
tion and Science suggest that most pupils in Central and 
Southern federal districts of Russia take a course “Prin-
ciples of Orthodoxy”, while in other federal districts, the 
course “Principles of secular ethics” prevails (see Ta-
ble 2). Although the majority of parents across Russia 
choose a secular education for their children, the de-
mand for religious education is on the rise. A challenge 
for policy makers is to govern how majority and minority 
religions are represented within the education system. 
Table 2: Regional distribution of a course on religious cul- 
tures and secular ethics in Russia (% of the 4th grade pupils 
enrolled in a particular course in 2013 / 2014 academic year) 
              Course Module 
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Average across Russia 46 19 31 4 0 
Central 40 14 46 0 0 
Southern 27 9 63 1 0 
Northwestern 55 18 27 0 0 
Far Eastern 54 19 27 0 0 
Siberian 58 21 19 1 1 
Ural 61 22 16 1 0 
Volga 48 24 27 1 0 
North Caucasian 23 23 14 40 0 
Source: http://www.interfax-religion.ru based on statistics from the 
Russian Ministry of Education and Science. 
Another important implication of the religiosity revival 
is related to income redistribution policies. A recent 
study by Benabou et al. (2015) distinguishes between 
three types of interaction between religious institutions 
and public spending. The first one is a “Western-
European” type with declining religiosity, high taxes, 
and generous secular public spending. The second 
type is a “Theocratic” one. Extreme religious beliefs, 
high taxes, and high public spending on religious insti-
tutions characterize this type. The third type is an in-
termediate one and combines moderate intervention of 
religious institutions into public sphere, low taxes, and 
tax exemptions of religious activities.  
The analysis of trends in religiosity and economic devel-
opment suggests that CEE countries converge to the 
“Western-European” type, while the FSU countries have 
more similarities with the intermediate type. A recent 
study by Popova and Selezneva (2015) also supports 
this argument. This study indicates that in Russia and 
Ukraine, individuals who attend religious services and 
pray have different attitudes toward income redistribution 
and the role of state than those who do not. On average, 
religious individuals consider receiving money without 
working as humiliating and are less supportive toward 
claiming state benefits than those who neither pray nor 
attend services. Thus, religiosity improves individual 
motivation to make personal effort in these countries.  
 
Perceptions of economic policies  
The revival of religiosity in transition economies also 
has implications for the perceptions and progress of 
economic reforms and policies in these countries. In a 
recent paper Popova (2014) underscores that economic 
reforms, including privatization, price liberalization, gov-
ernance and enterprise restructuring, and competition 
policy reform, have different effects on life satisfaction 
and economic and political perceptions of religious and 
non-religious people. This finding is based on a so-
called “insurance effect” of religiosity. 
In economic and psychological literature, the insurance 
effect of religiosity is found for such individual socioeco-
nomic outcomes as consumption expenditures, life satis-
faction, and mental health. This effect implies that reli-
gious people perceive stressful individual and 
countrywide events differently from the non-religious. 
Individual adverse events may include a layoff or divorce, 
while countrywide events include various economic 
shocks and reforms. Individual religiosity helps to smooth 
possible adverse effects of these events on life satisfac-
tion. This means that since religious people have a dif-
ferent system of values than the non-religious, their satis-
faction with life is less affected by these events.  
Popova (2014) discusses the implications of the insur-
ance effect of religiosity in the case of economic reforms 
in transition countries. For instance, it is found that reli-
gious people are affected by privatization less than the 
non-religious. Also, religiosity reinforces the effect of 
competition policy reform, and makes religious people 
less vulnerable to price liberalization and governance 
reform and restructuring. This implies that even though 
some economic reforms may have a negative impact on 
individual well-being in a short run, religious individuals 
are likely to be affected by these reforms less and, there-
fore, to resist economic reforms less than non-religious. 
In general, due to the revival of religiosity, the implemen-
tation of reforms in transition countries may be easier. 
This also assumes that the revival of religiosity will rein-
force the economic development and welfare improve-
ments in post-communist countries. 
 
Concluding remarks 
For decades religiosity in transition countries was sup-
pressed by the communist regime. After the fall of the 
Soviet Union most transition countries experienced a 
renaissance of religiosity. Since religiosity is closely 
related to a range of economic and political issues, 
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including the welfare state, education system, family, 
and health care, the revival of religiosity is a challenge 
for public policy making in the region.  
Religious people have economic and ethical attitudes 
that differ from the attitudes of non-religious people. 
Thus, there is an increasing need for taking into ac-
count the interests of both religious and non-religious 
communities in post-communist countries, when de-
signing and implementing public policies. 
There are several important patterns of religiosity revival 
in transition countries. First, contemporary religious par-
ticipation rates in both CEE and the FSU countries are 
still lower than historical ones, while the number of peo-
ple declaring secular values remains high. Second, the 
religiosity revival in transition countries is not homoge-
nous. CEE countries are more prone to secularization, 
similarly to most developed European countries, while in 
the FSU there is an increasing demand on traditional 
religions. These differences can be explained by uneven 
economic development of these country groups. 
The extent to which the revival of religiosity will affect 
the future of welfare state regimes in transition coun-
tries remains an open question. However, it is important 
to underscore that income inequality is a major factor 
that drives the shift from one type of interaction be-
tween religious institutions and welfare states to an-
other (Benabou et al., 2015). Thus, EU policies that 
target the income inequality in transition countries will 
also help to maintain the balance between religious 
institutions and public sphere in these countries. 
Even though the trends in religiosity in the FSU and CEE 
still differ, there is no reason to believe that this difference 
is a threat to neighboring countries. As research shows, 
religious people are less vulnerable to potential adverse 
effects of economic reforms and policies than are the 
non-religious. Besides, they react positively to policies 
promoting economic development. This implies that the 
revival of religiosity in transition countries serves welfare 
improvements and economic development of the region. 
Notes 
1 According to the EBRD classification, transition economies 
include the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 
The FSU group of countries includes Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldo-
va, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.  
In this policy issue, CEE countries include Albania, Bos-
nia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia.  
Western Europe (WE) includes Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
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